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Jean Hampton’s Theory of Punishment: A 
Critical Appreciation 
Richard Dagger
University of Richmond, rdagger@richmond.edu
Jean Hampton’s work first came to my attention in 1984, when 
the summer issue of Philosophy & Public Affairs appeared in my 
mailbox. Hampton’s essay in that issue, “The Moral Education 
Theory of Punishment,” did not persuade me—or many 
others, I suspect—that “punishment should not be justified 
as a deserved evil, but rather as an attempt, by someone who 
cares, to improve a wayward person” (Hampton 1984, 237). 
The essay did persuade me, though, that moral education is 
a plausible aim of punishment, even if it is not the “full and 
complete justification” Hampton claimed it to be (Hampton 
1984, 209). It also persuaded me that I would do well to keep 
an eye out for further work by this gifted philosopher.
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That judgment proved thoroughly justified when I read 
Hampton’s Hobbes and the Social Contract Tradition (1986) 
and Forgiveness and Mercy (1988), which she coauthored with 
my then-colleague at Arizona State University, Jeffrie Murphy. In 
those books, as in her earlier essay, I found a rare and admirable 
combination of lucidity, analytical rigor, and social engagement. 
Here was a philosopher who cared deeply about ideas and how 
they can help us to live well. The news of Professor Hampton’s 
sudden death in 1996 left me with a sense of personal loss, 
then, even though I had never met her. Like Jane Austen, from 
whose novels she drew examples, Jean Hampton died at the 
age of 41, leaving her admirers to regret, like Austen’s, the loss 
of what she would have written had she lived longer.
What makes the regret especially poignant is the 
knowledge that Hampton had not reached a fixed position in 
her thinking. She had strong convictions, to be sure, but one 
never had the sense that she had thought her last thought or 
said her last word on any subject. In the case of punishment, 
in fact, she was clearly moving away from the moral education 
theory when she and Murphy published Forgiveness and Mercy 
in 1988, and subsequent publications confirmed her adoption 
of what she came to call the “expressive theory of retribution” 
(Hampton 1992). This shift was in part a response to others’ 
criticisms of her attempt to justify punishment as a form of 
moral education, but it also reflected her own sense of the 
inadequacy of that justification. She was right to abandon the 
moral-education justification, in my view, and right to adopt a 
retributive theory in its place. There are two respects, though, 
in which I believe Hampton continued to be mistaken about 
punishment.
I
The first and more serious of these mistakes involves 
Hampton’s criticism of an argument Herbert Morris advanced 
in his influential “Persons and Punishment” (Morris 1968). 
According to Morris, there is a close connection between the fair 
distribution of benefits and burdens in a rule-governed activity, 
on the one hand, and the justification of legal punishment, on 
the other. Someone who violates the rules, Morris reasoned,
has something others have—the benefits of the 
system—but by renouncing what others have 
assumed, the burdens of self-restraint, he has acquired 
an unfair advantage. Matters are not even until this 
advantage is in some way erased. …[H]e owes 
something to others, for he has something that does 
not rightfully belong to him. Justice—that is, punishing 
such individuals—restores the equilibrium of benefits 
and burdens by taking from the individual what he 
owes, that is, exacting the debt. (Morris 1968, 478)
One need only think of the criminal law as a rule-governed 
activity or practice, as Morris did, to perceive the connection 
between the fair (or unfair) distribution of benefits and burdens 
and the justification of punishment. Those who followed Morris 
thus came to be known as advocates of the fair-play theory of 
punishment.
Hampton was not one of those who followed Morris down 
this path. She must have found something attractive in his 
reasoning, however, for she deemed “Persons and Punishment” 
one of the two “most persuasive brief presentations of retributive 
thinking” she had encountered—the other was P. F. Strawson’s 
“Freedom and Resentment” (Murphy and Hampton, 95)—and 
she returned to it repeatedly in her writings on punishment. The 
attraction apparently resides in two features of Morris’s theory: 
first, that it is retributive; and second, that it is at least potentially 
expressive or communicative. For if criminals deserve to be paid 
back for the wrong they have done in taking unfair advantage 
of the law-abiding members of society, as Morris argued, then 
society has a right to express its disapproval of the law-breakers’ 
unjust conduct as it punishes them.1
These two features of the fair-play theory must have 
appealed to Hampton because they addressed what she 
came to regard as defects in the moral-education approach to 
punishment. One of these defects, as she said in acknowledging 
Joel Feinberg’s criticism, is that there are “too many criminals 
on whom such a [morally educative] message would be 
completely lost; for example, amoral risk-takers, revolutionary 
zealots, sociopathic personalities” (Hampton 1992, 21). If 
moral education provides the “full and complete justification” 
for punishment that she once sought, then it would seem that 
there is no good reason to punish such people, no matter how 
heinous the crimes they committed. A second defect is that 
the moral-education approach neglects the victims of crime. 
By focusing on the “wayward person” who is to be improved 
through punishment, in other words, the moral education theory 
deflects attention from those who suffered at the hands of the 
offender. As she admitted in the course of her exchanges with 
Murphy in Forgiveness and Mercy, there is a sense in which 
criminals seek to lower, demean, or degrade their victims, 
and the law ought to do something in response to reaffirm the 
victims’ human worth or value. She proposed, accordingly, 
that “retributive punishment is the defeat of the wrongdoer at 
the hands of the victim (either directly or indirectly through an 
agent of the victim’s, e.g., the state) that symbolizes the correct 
relative value of the wrongdoer and victim. It is a symbol that 
is conceptually required to reaffirm a victim’s equal worth in 
the face of a challenge to it” (Murphy and Hampton, 125-26).2 
In contrast to moral education, then, “retribution isn’t about 
making a criminal better; it is about denying a false claim of 
relative value” (Murphy and Hampton, 133). Retribution is thus 
to be understood not only as a way of paying back the offender 
for the wrong he or she has done but also as an expression of 
society’s refusal to accept the wrongdoer’s implicit claim to 
be more important or valuable—of greater worth—than his or 
her victims. Hence Hampton’s theory of expressive retribution.
In developing this theory, Hampton found it necessary 
to distinguish it from Morris’s fair-play approach.3 In doing so, 
she developed two criticisms of Morris’s position. According 
to the first criticism, Morris’s theory is insufficiently retributive. 
That is, Morris’s reliance on the idea that punishment is a way 
of restoring the equilibrium between benefits and burdens 
upset by criminal wrongdoing leads him, and those who have 
followed, to a theory that “essentially makes retributive justice a 
species of distributive justice…” (Hampton 2007, 109). On such 
a view, punishment is nothing more than a matter of depriving 
people of undeserved advantages so as to return the benefits 
and burdens of social cooperation to their proper balance. 
Morris’s theory is headed in the right direction, Hampton says, in 
that it attempts to provide an account “of what it is that makes an 
action wrong”; but the attempt fails because Morris’s account “is 
simply incorrect” (Hampton 1991, 5; also Hampton 2007, 110). 
This claim flows from Hampton’s second line of criticism, 
which she shares with other critics of the fair-play theory. 
Morris’s account of the wrongfulness of criminal actions is 
mistaken, Hampton argues, because it requires us to take an 
“odd, even disturbing view of crime” according to which rape, 
robbery, murder, and other criminal acts are nothing more than 
ways of gaining an unfair advantage (Hampton 1991, 4)—an 
advantage, moreover, that we would presumably wish to enjoy 
ourselves. Such a view is not only incorrect but “repulsive”; for 
“those who value right relationships with others do not find laws 
against extortion or rape or theft burdensome constraints that 
they would willingly throw off if only such constraints weren’t 
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collectively rational” (Hampton 1991, 4). The wrongfulness 
of crime must reside elsewhere; and on Hampton’s account, 
it resides in criminals’ attempts to degrade or demean their 
victims.
These are cogent criticisms. Nevertheless, I believe them to 
be mistaken. To begin with Hampton’s complaint that Morris’s 
approach is insufficiently retributive, it is easy to see why she 
thinks that Morris in effect reduces retribution to a matter 
of distribution. But there is more to Morris’s argument—and 
more that is helpful to Hampton’s position—than Hampton 
acknowledges. As Hampton herself admits, Morris’s approach 
more easily accounts for the wrongfulness of some crimes than 
her own theory does. It is much easier, for example, to conceive 
of tax evasion, shoplifting, and speeding as forms of free riding 
on the cooperative efforts of others than it is to see them as 
attempts to demean or degrade others. Yet Hampton tries to turn 
this difficulty into an advantage of her theory in the following 
way: “it is not so much the free-riding as what the free-riding 
symbolizes about the worth of the victim, that makes the tax 
evasion wrong” (Hampton 1991, 24, n. 11). In saying this, I take it, 
she means tax evaders and other free-riding criminals are doing 
something more, and worse, than simply seeking an advantage 
for themselves. They are also acting on the belief that they are 
of greater value or worth than those nameless, faceless people 
whose law-abiding cooperation makes it possible for them to 
enjoy the benefits of the legal order without bearing their fair 
share of its burdens. These criminals are not only free riders, 
in other words; they are wrongdoers who must be defeated 
in order to deny the false claims their actions imply about the 
relative value of the wrongdoers and their victims.
This position is, I believe, correct. But it is also, contrary 
to what Hampton says, substantially the same as Morris’s 
position. Hampton draws the contrast between her position and 
Morris’s in this way: “Morris thought that we objected to free 
riders merely because they got something for nothing and we 
did not. I am arguing that this situation bothers us in a morally 
significant way because of how it represents them as superior 
to us—with entitlements to goods and services that we cannot 
claim” (Hampton 2007, 130). To characterize Morris’s argument 
in this way, however, is unfair.
 If Hampton were right, then Morris would be saying that 
criminals are on a par with the person who is simply lucky 
enough to enjoy a windfall, for both get something for nothing. 
But Morris says nothing of the kind. One need only look to the 
passage from “Persons and Punishment” reproduced above to 
see that he takes the rule breaker to be “renouncing what others 
have assumed, the burdens of self-restraint” (Morris 1968, 478, 
emphasis added). Moreover, the rule-breaker must act to take 
unfair advantage of others, thereby acquiring something that 
does not “rightfully belong to him” (Morris 1968, 478, emphasis 
added). Other passages from “Persons and Punishment” make 
the point even more clearly, beginning with Morris’s striking 
claim that “we have a right to punishment” that “derives from 
a fundamental human right to be treated as a person…” (Morris 
1968, 476). This claim Morris develops by way of a contrast 
between punishment and therapy, with the former being the 
appropriate treatment for a person who violates “the core 
rules of our criminal law”—rules “that prohibit violence and 
deception and compliance with which provides benefits for all 
persons” (Morris 1968, 477). But these benefits, as we have seen, 
are possible only because enough people bear the burden of 
exercising self-restraint “over inclinations that would, if satisfied, 
directly interfere or create a substantial risk of interference with 
others in proscribed ways” (Morris 1968, 477). The lawbreaker 
does not simply happen to enjoy an advantage over others, in 
short. He takes steps to gain this advantage without regard to 
the rights that others have, as persons, to fair treatment. That 
is why the punishment of lawbreakers is “associated with 
resentment, for the guilty are those who have done what they 
had no right to do by failing to exercise restraint when they 
might have and where others have” (Morris 1968, 483). It is also 
why we try to make the punishment fit the crime by aiming 
at “some equivalence between the advantage gained by the 
wrongdoer—partly based upon the seriousness of the interest 
invaded, partly on the state of mind with which the wrongful 
act was performed—and the punishment meted out” (Morris 
1968, 483-84,emphasis added). On Morris’s account, in sum, 
the rule breaker is not merely someone who, in Hampton’s 
words, “got something for nothing and we did not.” For Morris, 
as for Hampton, the rule breaker is wrong, and deserving of 
punishment, because his actions reveal that he holds himself 
to be superior to, or more important than, those whose 
cooperation he is exploiting and whose value as persons he 
is demeaning.
Hampton is wrong, then, to characterize Morris’s theory as 
insufficiently retributive. She could concede this point, however, 
while continuing to insist that her expressive retributivism is 
superior to the fair-play theory of punishment. After all, Morris 
and other advocates of the fair-play theory are still in the 
embarrassing position of reducing rape, murder, assault, and 
other terrible crimes to the status of free-rider offenses, such 
as tax evasion and littering. But are they? Elsewhere I have 
responded to others who have raised this criticism (Dagger 
1993, 2008), but for present purposes two brief comments seem 
to be in order. The first is that Hampton’s attempt to indicate 
how her expressive retributivism can account for tax evasion 
and other crimes of free riding is a kind of philosophical two-
way street. That is, if Hampton can appeal to “what the free-
riding symbolizes about the worth of the victim” to explain 
how the free riding is wrong (Hampton 1991, 24, n. 11), then 
Morris and the advocates of the fair-play theory can appeal to 
similar considerations when they apply their theory to murder, 
rape, and other crimes that are more than merely matters of 
free riding and unfair play. If free riding expresses a kind of 
contempt or disrespect for others, then it differs only in degree 
from the egregious crimes that bespeak, according to Hampton, 
a false claim about the relative value of victim and wrongdoer. 
There is also the question—and this is my second point—of 
who is to do the punishing. As we have seen, Hampton holds 
that “retributive punishment is the defeat of the wrongdoer at 
the hands of the victim (either directly or indirectly through an 
agent of the victim’s, e.g., the state) that symbolizes the correct 
relative value of wrongdoer and victim” (Murphy and Hampton, 
125). But what is it that makes the state the victim’s agent? To 
answer this question we shall need a theory of legal authority; 
and that is something Morris’s approach can supply by reference 
to the state as the agency that maintains the cooperative, rule-
governed enterprise that we call the rule of law.
II
In my view, then, Hampton’s criticism of Morris’s theory rests 
on a misunderstanding of his enterprise—an enterprise that is 
grounded, like hers, in the idea of the equal worth of persons. 
Playing fair is in large part a matter of respecting the equal 
worth of others, and punishment is justified, for Morris as for 
Hampton, as a way of denying the wrongdoer’s implicit claim 
to superior status. Hampton’s theory of punishment would be 
stronger, therefore, if she had built on, rather than rejected, 
Morris’s insights. I shall try to substantiate this claim shortly, 
but it is necessary first to identify the second mistake in her 
writings on punishment.
This mistake occurs in the course of Professor Hampton’s 
movement from the moral-education theory of punishment to 
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expressive retributivism. I believe, as I have said, that she was 
wise to move in this direction, but I believe she erred in adopting 
a pluralistic approach to punishment as a result. In “The Moral 
Education Theory of Punishment” Hampton not only argued that 
moral education “can provide a full and complete justification” 
for punishment; she also criticized “patchwork” approaches to 
punishment that draw on more than one justificatory reason 
(Hampton 1984, 209).4 When she concluded that moral 
education cannot provide the “full and complete justification” 
for punishment that she was seeking, however, she apparently 
decided that no unitary justification is to be found. Retribution 
thus came to be the “primary justification” of punishment in 
a theory that also includes deterrence and moral education 
as “moral obligations of states”—obligations that “can affect, 
and sometimes override, the obligation to inflict retributive 
punishment” (Hampton 2007, 149, emphasis added).
The problem here is not that Hampton tried to find room 
for considerations of deterrence and moral education in her 
theory; the problem is that she did not try to integrate them into 
the kind of unitary or unifying approach she had endorsed in 
“The Moral Education Theory of Punishment.” As a result, her 
theory offers no clear way of accommodating the sometimes 
conflicting demands of retribution, moral education, and 
deterrence. Hampton has not been the only philosopher to 
take a pluralist approach to punishment, of course, and it may 
be that some kind of awkward, ad hoc juggling is the best we 
can do when these considerations seem to be at odds with one 
another. Relying on juggling of this kind is not the most elegant 
or desirable theoretical posture, however, and Hampton would 
have done well to look for a way to provide greater unity to her 
theory. Had she lived longer, I suspect that she would have 
done so. But she had already dismissed, as we have seen, 
the theory that I believe can bring retribution, deterrence, and 
moral education into harmony—that is, the theory of fair play.
In brief, the fair-play theory conceives of the legal order as 
a cooperative enterprise in which the members have a duty to 
one another, ceteris paribus, to do their part in the enterprise 
by obeying the law. Punishment under law serves as a means 
of assuring the law-abiding members of the enterprise that 
those who would take advantage of their cooperation by 
breaking the law will be subject to sanctions if they do. Those 
who do not play fair thus open themselves to punishment. In 
this way the fair-play theory incorporates both forward-looking 
elements and the backward-looking point of view characteristic 
of retributivism. Fair-play punishment is backward-looking, 
or retributive, in that it is to be imposed only on those who 
have committed an offense; no other consideration, such as 
deterrence, is a sufficient warrant. But punishment on the fair-
play account is also forward-looking in two respects. First, it 
aims to deter the commission of crimes, thereby providing a 
measure of assurance to those who are willing to obey the law 
that others will not take unfair advantage of them. And second, 
fair-play punishment looks to the future by aiming at the reform 
or moral education of those who break the law. One of the 
purposes of punishment, in other words, will be to support the 
cooperative enterprise by helping those who have not played 
fair to see the error of their ways.5 By doing so, punishment 
can help to secure the cooperative enterprise as it pays back 
wrongdoers for actions that, in one way or another, to lesser 
and greater extents, have failed to respect the equal worth of 
other members of the enterprise.
 Such an approach to punishment will not eliminate 
the occasional tensions that arise when considerations of 
retribution, deterrence, and moral education pull in different 
directions. Fair play is not a unitary theory in the sense that 
classical utilitarianism is, with a single, (supposedly) simple 
principle supplying the standard according to which all 
judgments and decisions are to be made. But neither is it a 
theory that requires independent and rival considerations to be 
patched together, case by case; nor does it provide a “primary 
justification” for punishment that other considerations may 
“sometimes override,” as Hampton’s expressive retributivism 
does. When the tensions do arise among retribution, deterrence, 
and moral education—and perhaps other considerations—the 
fair-play theorist will have resources for reconciling the tensions. 
In the case of the desire to enhance the deterrent or educative 
effect of punishment, fair-play theory requires us to look for 
ways in which greater deterrence or better moral education 
can strengthen the cooperative enterprise by bringing the 
benefits and burdens of the enterprise into a better balance. 
Perhaps stricter sentences will reduce the number of certain 
offenses, for example, and thus provide greater assurance to 
law-abiding people that their cooperation is not in vain; or 
perhaps efforts to promote reparation and reintegration will 
contribute to this assurance by leading to a decline in recidivism 
and a rise in the number of law-abiding members of society. 
Cooperative enterprises are not static, after all; they require 
adjustments and adaptation. But if investigation reveals that 
enhanced deterrence or improved moral education are only 
to be achieved at the expense of the fairness of the enterprise, 
then those demands must be rejected; they cannot override the 
basic commitment to fair play. Whether such demands should 
or should not be rejected will not always be easy to determine. 
Judgments will differ, and debate may persist. Even so, fair-play 
theory offers valuable guidance in these matters, including 
standards that set the terms of the debate. In this respect, it is 
clearly superior to a patchwork approach to the justification of 
punishment.
III
I have argued that Jean Hampton was mistaken when she 
rejected the fundamental insight of Herbert Morris’s “Persons 
and Punishment” and mistaken when she gave up her 
attempt to develop or discover a unitary rather than a pluralist 
justification of punishment. I do not mean to suggest, though, 
that Hampton’s writings on punishment are fundamentally 
misguided or unworthy of serious consideration. On the 
contrary, Hampton’s writings on punishment, as on other 
subjects, are rich with insight and far more often right, in my 
view, than wrong. To illustrate this point—and to indicate how 
Hampton’s theory of punishment would be strengthened by 
grounding it in fair play—I shall turn in conclusion to an essay 
published two years after her death.
This essay, “Punishment, Feminism, and Political Identity: 
A Case Study in the Expressive Meaning of Law” (Hampton 
1998), is a product of the invitation Hampton received in 1995 
to testify as an expert witness in a case in Canada. The case 
involved the Canadian practice of suspending voting rights of 
prisoners serving sentences of two years or more—a practice 
that some prisoners challenged as a violation of their rights 
under the Canadian Charter of Rights and Freedoms adopted 
in 1982. Hampton accepted the invitation, testified on behalf 
of the government, and subsequently elaborated her reasons 
for doing so in this fascinating essay.
These reasons, not surprisingly, are drawn from her theory 
of expressive retributivism, with nods to deterrence and moral 
education. In particular, she argues that Canada is justified in 
denying voting rights to serious offenders during their prison 
terms as a form of expressive punitive response. It is justified 
because those who commit crimes that damage their victims’ 
ability to live as free and equal members of the political society 
are in a sense attacking the core political values of a democratic 
society. It is fitting, then, that society respond with an expression 
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of its refusal to countenance such actions by, among other 
things, disenfranchising these offenders. As Hampton puts the 
point,
When we vote, we do something. …Our hands are on 
the levers of political power. Now we would not give 
that lever to an enemy of our state—someone who 
would want to destroy it, or who wants to undermine 
the values animating it. We would not do such a thing 
because it would be a betrayal both of our country and 
of the values we believe it stands for, especially the 
values of freedom and equality. (Hampton 1998, 41)
Because serious offenders have acted in ways that “undermine 
the values animating” the democratic state, it is entirely proper 
that their punishment include disenfranchisement while they 
are imprisoned.
Hampton also appeals to moral education and deterrence 
to support this conclusion. In the former case, her claim is that 
“[e]xpressive punitive responses, such as the suspension of 
voting rights, have the potential for provoking thought that can 
bring about a change in the wrongdoer’s way of thinking about 
himself and his society” (Hampton 1998, 43). Moreover, this 
policy has the salutary effect of telling not only offenders but 
every member of the society that “this law links the exercise 
of freedom with responsibility for its effects” (Hampton 1998, 
43), thereby extending its value as a form of moral education 
to the entire population. With regard to deterrence, Hampton 
acknowledges that the standard arguments are not likely to 
apply, for there is no reason to believe that the prospect of 
losing one’s right to vote by itself would deter anyone from 
committing the kind of serious offense that leads to a sentence 
of two years or more in prison. Still, she argues, the policy of 
disenfranchisement “hopes to achieve an educative deterrent 
effect, based upon its ability to make us think. Whether or not 
prisoners in penitentiaries reflect on what this law means, 
perhaps the rest of us will, reaching conclusions about what 
society expects of us in our conduct and attitudes toward 
others that will make us better citizens” (Hampton 1998, 43-44, 
emphasis added).
In addition to these appeals to the three considerations she 
identified in her earlier essays as the elements of a satisfactory 
justification of punishment—retribution, moral education, and 
deterrence—Hampton also draws on two other considerations 
important enough to feature in the title of her essay: feminism 
and political identity. Feminism is important to her position 
here largely as a means of countering an argument made by 
expert witnesses who testified on behalf of the plaintiffs in this 
case—that is, on behalf of the convicted offenders who were 
seeking to have their voting rights restored while serving their 
sentences. According to Hampton’s account, these witnesses 
maintained that the offenders were themselves typically the 
victims of oppression and abuse, so that suspending their voting 
rights amounted to adding insult to the injuries they had already 
received. In response, Hampton argues that serious offenders 
are overwhelmingly male and many of their offenses have been 
directed against women. In these cases, their crimes are “forms 
of hate crimes—ways not only of hurting particular women but 
also of subordinating women as a whole. To hand the levers 
of political power over to someone whose behavior manifests 
an intention to accomplish the subordination of women to 
men undermines not only the democratic value of equality 
but the status and safety of women in that society” (Hampton 
1998, 41-42). She thus links feminism to “political identity,” and 
particularly the identity of a polity committed to democratic 
values, which “not only helps to hold the pluralist society 
together but also helps people to have a sense of themselves 
as members of that political community” (Hampton 1998, 23).
Is Hampton right to defend laws that suspend the voting 
rights of serious offenders? I believe so. But I believe that the 
position she defends would be even stronger were it couched in 
the terms of the fair-play theory of punishment. For one thing, as I 
indicated in the previous section, these terms would provide her 
with a more coherent basis for her arguments than the various 
considerations she invokes. For another, fair-play theory points 
to a second conclusion about the voting rights of felons that I 
am confident Hampton would want to endorse—that is, the 
conclusion that these offenders must regain the vote when their 
sentences come to an end. Once the debt to society has been 
discharged, it is only fair that the ex-offender be restored to full 
membership in society. Finally, fair-play theory provides a firmer 
basis for Hampton’s position than does her appeal to “political 
identity.” Law, as she says, can be “a significant expressive force” 
in a community by “symbolizing the community’s sense of its 
values and (what I will call) its ‘political personality’” (Hampton 
1998, 23). This appeal to political identity or personality, however, 
will produce the results Hampton wants only when the values 
of the community are democratic values that respect everyone 
as a free and equal citizen. In a thoroughly hierarchical and 
highly traditional society, Hampton’s attempt to link concerns 
about the domination and oppression of women to the society’s 
“political personality” would be a nonstarter. What she needs is 
a conception of the political and legal order that is grounded not 
in identity or personality but in the conviction that the properly 
functioning order is a cooperative enterprise in which the 
members enjoy rights and incur duties to one another as free and 
equal citizens. Such a conception is at the heart of the fair-play 
theory of punishment.
IV
How would Jean Hampton respond to the points I have raised 
in this essay? I like to think that she would recognize their 
merits and conclude that the fair-play theory draws together 
and harmonizes all of the elements that she thought necessary 
to the justification of punishment. But even if she were to grant 
this much, I suspect that she would also insist that the advocates 
of fair-play theory have paid too little attention to the sufferings 
of victims and the moral improvement of offenders. And she 
would be right.6
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Endnotes
1. Morris’s commitment to the expressive or “communicative 
component” of punishment is clearer in another essay of his 
that Hampton frequently cited (Morris 1981).
2. The quoted passage also appears on pp. 398-99 of Hampton 
1991, which pulls material from chaps. 2 and 4 of Murphy 
and Hampton into a single essay.
3. In addition to Murphy and Hampton, pp. 114-16 (and the 
corresponding pp. 384-86 in Hampton 1991), see Hampton 
1992, pp. 4-5, and pp. 109-110 of her essay, “Righting Wrongs: 
The Goal of Retribution” in Hampton 2007. This last essay 
originally appeared as “Correcting Harms and Righting 
Wrongs: The Goal of Retribution,” UCLA Law Review 39 
(1992): 1659-1702.
4. The reference to the “patchwork approach to punishment” 
occurs in n. 2, which begins on p. 208 of Hampton 1984. 
Hampton refers in particular to Herbert Morris’s endorsement 
of such an approach in Morris 1981.
5. For elaboration of this point, see Dagger 2011.
6. Thanks to Herbert Morris, Jeffrie Murphy, and the editors for 
helpful reactions to an earlier draft of this essay.
